Aristotle’s Three Types of Friendship: Virtue, Pleasure, and Utility

What Three Types Does Aristotle Distinguish?

In Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes three fundamental types of friendship — based on what friends value in each other: virtue, pleasure, or utility. He argues that friendship (philia) is key to human happiness — but not every form is equally valuable.

Virtue Friendship: The Highest Form

In a virtue friendship, both friends admire the inner virtue (arete) of the other — their character, integrity, and values. Because virtues are stable and endure through crises, this friendship is especially lasting. The friend is experienced as an “other self”— extending one’s own identity.

Cooper (1977) puts it concisely: through a friend, you gain an “objective view of yourself.” You recognize your friend as fundamentally similar, yet can observe them with enough distance to judge objectively. For Aristotle, this capacity for self-knowledge through friendship is a key reason why friendship contributes to happiness.

What matters is the order of appreciation: you find your friend useful and pleasant becauseyou love them as a person — not the other way around. Valuing a friend only for their usefulness or entertainment turns them into an instrument and misses genuine reciprocity.

Virtue friendship requires both parties to know each other’s full character. This takes time, shared experiences, and the willingness to be vulnerable. Sherman (1987) emphasizes that friendship creates the “context for expressing virtue and ultimately for happiness.”

Pleasure and Utility Friendship

Pleasure friendshipis based on shared enjoyment: the friend is funny, entertaining, a great conversation partner. These friendships are livelier than utility friendships but fragile — when the enjoyment changes, the relationship falters. Aristotle typically associates them with youth, when friendships are often built on shared experiences.

Utility friendshipis the most fragile form. Both sides benefit practically from each other: through business connections, referrals, or mutual help. Once the benefit disappears, so does the relationship. That does not make it worthless — Aristotle acknowledges that friends are also instruments of happiness, since without them we can hardly perform noble actions.

The three types often overlap. Even virtue friendship contains elements of pleasure and utility — and is not diminished by them. The question is not whether pleasure or utility are present, but whether they are the foundation or a side effect of the friendship.

Is the Classification Still Relevant Today?

The core question — do you value your friend for their own sake or for some benefit? — is timeless. It helps you honestly assess your own relationships: which friendships are based on genuine interest in the other person? Which would end if the shared context disappeared?

But the limits of the classification are obvious. Aristotle restricts the highest friendship to equal-status, virtuous adults — meaning exclusively free men of Greek society. Women, enslaved people, and children were excluded. Moreover, virtue friendship presupposes that people possess objectively virtuous qualities — an assumption that is hard to sustain in a modern pluralism of values.

Modern definitions of friendship therefore place greater emphasis on emotional closeness, voluntariness, and informality rather than virtue. Yet the three-part framework remains valuable as a tool for reflection: it forces you to question the foundationof a relationship — and that is useful in every era.

What Does Philia Mean?

The Greek philiais considerably broader than the modern word “friendship.” Aristotle includes family relationships, fellow citizens, and business contacts — the cobbler in the neighborhood belongs to philia just as much as a best friend.

Pakaluk (2005) describes philia as any affection that hopes for or finds reciprocation— however attenuated. Within this broad spectrum, Aristotle places virtue-based friendship among equals at the top. The “lesser forms” still have their value.

For distinguishing friendship from other types of relationships, this broad understanding matters: Aristotle’s philia warns against defining friendship too narrowly. Communicating appreciation — recognizing and reciprocating affection — is the connecting element across all forms.

Frequently Asked Questions

What types of friendship did Aristotle identify?

Aristotle distinguished three types: virtue friendship (based on admiration of character), pleasure friendship (based on shared enjoyment), and utility friendship (based on mutual practical benefit). All three require reciprocity, but only virtue friendship qualifies as perfect friendship.

What is a virtue friendship?

The highest form of friendship according to Aristotle. Both friends admire the inner virtue (arete) of the other — their character, integrity, and values. Because virtues are stable, this friendship is especially enduring. The friend is experienced as an “other self.”

What does Philia mean in Aristotle?

Philia is broader than the modern word “friendship.” Aristotle includes family relationships, fellow citizens, and business contacts. Pakaluk describes Philia as any affection that hopes for or finds reciprocation — however attenuated.

Is Aristotle’s classification still relevant today?

The three-part framework remains insightful. The core question — do you value your friend for their own sake or for some benefit? — is timeless. But Aristotle’s restriction to virtuous, equal-status men is outdated. Modern definitions emphasize emotional closeness and voluntariness rather than virtue.